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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
According to the record before this Court, Appellant
was not aware of the impediment to the marriage until after the
Decree of Divorce was entered.

Therefore Appellant raised his

jurisdictional defense as soon as he had knowledge of the
defense.
Appellee cites two cases to refute Appellantfs defense
of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The first case is a

Kansas case which appears to address in personam jurisdiction
rather than subject matter jurisdiction. Clearly once a person
accepts in personam jurisdiction of the court, they cannot
later object to in personam jurisdiction.

However, subject

matter jurisdiction is another matter.
The second case cited by Appellee is a Utah case which
clearly states that the Court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter in a case such as this.
because

the

Court went

problem due to fraud.
no

fraud

on to

Appellee cites the case

overlook

the

jurisdictional

In the case before the Court, there is

and therefore there

is no jurisdiction

over the

subject matter.
The Court did abuse its discretion in its Findings that
Appellant was aware of the impediment prior to the Decree of
Divorce.

The only record before the Court is the Affidavit of
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Plaintiff that states at the time of the Affidavit, he had only
recently become aware of the impediment.

The standard of

review of this Court is that it will presume the trial Court
used appropriate discretion unless the record clearly shows to
the contrary.

In this case, the record clearly shows to the

contrary.
Appellee has misapplied the standard of review for a
Motion for New Trial which requires a showing of manifest abuse
of discretion.

That standard of review is not appropriate in

this case as there has not been a Motion for a New Trial.
ARGUMENT
APPELLANT HAS NOT WAIVED HIS DEFENSE OF LACK OF
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AT THE TRIAL COURT LEVEL
According
Plaintiff's

to

the

Affidavit,

only

record

Appellant

was

before
not

the

aware

court,
of

the

impediment to the marriage until after the Decree of Divorce.
That being the case, Appellant was unable to assert his
jurisdictional defense until he became aware of the impediment.
Appellee cites two cases in support of her position
that Appellant is estopped from asserting the defense of lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. The first case cited Rinehart
v. Rinehart, 83 P.2d 628 (Kansas 1938) appears to be a case
where the court is addressing in personam jurisdiction rather
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than subject matter jurisdiction. Essentially the argument is
that once the individual has accepted jurisdiction of the court
the party is then estopped from denying such jurisdiction.
Further, her arguments regarding the application of the statute
do not apply in this case. All of this seems to indicate that
the

jurisdiction

spoken

of

in Rhinehart

is in

personam

jurisdiction rather than subject matter jurisdiction.
The second case referred to by Appellee is the same
case which Appellant cites in support of his position.

In

Caffal v. Caffal. 5 Utah 2d 407, 303 P.2d 386 (1956) the Utah
Supreme Court clearly stated there was no subject matter
jurisdiction to hear a divorce when there was not a valid
marriage.

However, Appellee cites the portion of the case

which indicates that if the party is aware of the impediment
at the time of filing for divorce, then the party is estopped
from alleging lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The situation in Caffal was that of fraud. The husband
was aware of the impediment and never informed the court of the
impediment at the time of the divorce action.

Furthermore,

there was about a two-year period before any action was taken
to attempt to set aside the divorce.

The fraud aspects of

Caffal are not present in the case before the court.
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Simply

put, Appellant believes Caffal supports his proposition that
there is no subject matter jurisdiction.
Appellant asks the court to apply practical reasoning
to this case.
certainly

Had Appellant known about the impediment, he

would

have

disclosed

that

information

to

his

attorney, and his attorney would have advised him that an
annulment would have been in his best interest where he did not
wish to pay alimony.

Consequently, Appellant would have

pursued a Decree of Annulment in the first place rather than
waiting, unless, as is his testimony, Appellant was not aware
of the impediment until after the Decree of Divorce was
entered.

This is the same factual pattern as Jones v. Jones,

161 So. 836 (Fla. 1935).

In Jones, the court felt that the

marriage was voidable rather than void because there was a
presumptively valid common law marriage after the removal of
the impediment.

However, the court still felt that the

marriage was voidable because the parties seeking to set aside
the marriage entered a Decree of Annulment with an innocent
party not being made aware of the impediment until after the
Decree of Divorce.

Likewise, Appellant is an innocent party

and should not be penalized for what he was not made aware of
prior to the entry of the Decree of Divorce.
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It is difficult to imagine that Appellant should be
estopped

from

applicable

at

asserting

a

the

of

time

defense
the

he

was

original

not

aware

divorce

was

action.

Therefore, in light of Caffal and in light of the evidence
before the court, Appellant asks this court to find that the
trial court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction to enter a

Decree of Divorce.
THE TRIAL COURT DID ABUSE ITS DISCRETION ON ITS
FINDINGS OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DECREE
Appellant is frankly confused by Appellee's argument
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
findings or its entry of a Decree of Divorce.
and

entry

of

Appellant's

the divorce

knowledge,

are not

however

at

the

in its

The findings

issue

on

appeal

findings

of

the

to

court

regarding Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside the Decree are at
issue.

Appellee correctly cites Donohue v. Int. Health Care,

Inc. , 748 P. 2d 1067, 68 (Utah 1987) that the standard of review
is

that

the

higher

court

will

presume

the

court

used

appropriate discretion unless the record clearly shows to the
contrary.

Of course, Appellant's argument is that the only

record before the court .is directly contrary to the court's
findings regarding the Motion to Set Aside Decree of Divorce.
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Appellee states that there was testimony heard by the
trial judge on November 9, 1989, at the time of the actual
divorce hearing.

However, there is no record before the court

to clarify what that testimony was. Appellant is doubtful that
at the time of the divorce hearing, any testimony was offered
that both parties were aware of the impediment to the marriage
at the time the marriage was entered into.

If that testimony

had been offered, it would seem that the trial court would have
taken exception to that testimony.

Nevertheless, Appellee has

waived any arguments which that testimony may have presented
to that court by not producing the record.

(See Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure, Rule 11).
Appellee also cites Amos v. Bennion, 517 P. 2d 1008.
Appellee quotes Amos as saying that a "ruling . . . will not
be disturbed

on appeal

except when

manifest abuse of discretion."

When

there

is a clear

and

in fact it stated a

"ruling on a Motion for a new trial will not be disturbed on
appeal

except

. . . abuse

of discretion."

Id

at 1010.

Appellant feels that Amos has been misquoted in this particular
instance or at least mis-applied.
CONCLUSION
Appellee has narrowed the scope of appeal by conceding
in her brief that there is no issue of common law marriage.
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Consequently the issues to be decided by this court all revolve
around the ability of the trial court enter a Decree of Divorce
on a marriage which is void ab initio.

Appellant asks this

court to find that the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to enter a Decree of Divorce that the trial court
erred in assuming a void ab initio marriage must have a Decree
declaring it void in order to be void, that the trial court
erred in not declaring the Decree of Divorce void, thus the
trial court erred in finding that both parties were aware of
the existence of the impediment and that the trial court abused
its discretion in not granting the motion to Set Aside the
Judgment pursuant to Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
<i

DATED this 3J"" day of March, 1991.
JEAN ROBERT BABILIS & ASSOCIATES

Randall Lee Marshall
Attorney for Appellant
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